Turkmenbashi - or what?

from: here

The Great Game by Peter Hopkirk

Regarding the publicity the term 'New Great Game' gets these days, I was very tempted to know more about the source of this adapted term. The 'Great Game' - a book written by Peter Hopkirk in 1994 - is the result of years of research. Peter Hopkirk, says a blurb on the back of the tome, is the laureate of the Great Game - whatever multilayered term it is. In essence, it could be swiftly defined as the imperial struggle for supremacy in Central Asia between Victorian England and Tzarist Russia. Hopkirk's book is a challenging 600-page tour de force, full of romantic anecdotal accounts of what happened throughout the 19th century and dominated Russo-Anglo bilateral relationships over this timespan. The story is blossoming with obscurities and adventures, from first expeditions of British and Russian adventurers to the realms of unknown and fabled Central Asian rulers to the brink of armed conflicts over the gateways to India. The amount of research the author has done is unrivaled; numerous original references and acribic accounts speak for endless hours in remote library archives of the Royal Geographical Society in London and - what makes his story a rather balanced approach to historical geo-politics - Russian data in Moscow.

A big deal of the Great Game based on a variety of perceived threats and the ignorance of decisionmakers at Whitehall and St. Petersburg. The United Kingdom's position seemed to swing according to who was in charge of affairs. A Tory government usually meant a revival of Russophobe ideology - leading to frosty diplomatic ties between the two superpowers. Russia in the 19th century was viewed with some sort of ambivalence. Its cultural distance and political backwardness appeared incompatible with Victorian progress, and the sheer scale of this Eastern empire led to suspicion so that Moscow's moves were watched with anxiety and analyses saw the country on the constant verge of expansionism. The excursions into the Southern tier of its area of influence fed this theory. Count Nesselrode said in a cabinet meeting as early as 1816: ‘As long as Middle Asia is not ours, we must not spend any thoughts on the conquest of whole Asia.”

However, the Great Game went alongside Britain's industrialisation, which meant that her fleet became far more powerful, her armies had more firepower, and her worldwide colonial possessions made her have a strategic advantage. But, this last point also revealed Britain's potential disadvantage in the Great Game. Today, one would call these symptoms characteristic of an 'overstretched' empire. Still, problems were more of a practical nature: In case of a Russian attack on British belongings in India; how could one react quickly with a reasonable counterforce? This question lied at the very heart of strategic reasoning of the Great Game. It boosted careers of risky adventurers and discoverers cartographing the region and designing shaky alliances with unruly despots while making sure that one's moves are not being monitored by Moscow. There were winners and loosers; but Russia and Britain, though, never declared open war on eachother over the rivalries of the Great Game. It was a quiet and secret undertaking, carried out on distant passes and valleys in the heart of Central Asia - an area, which was by then terra incognita for the adversaries and bore various surprises, good and bad. Ultimately, the feared invasion never came.

When play began early in the 19th century, the frontiers of the two imperial powers lay two thousand miles apart, across vast deserts and almost impassable mountain ranges; by the end, only some miles separated the two rivals.

The narrow strip with which Afghanistan stretches out to the far North-East is called the Wakhan corridor (see map):

British strategists had feared that the Tsar would claim this territory, so in the closing years of the 19th century, a narrow corridor of land was given to Afghanistan, to create a neutral buffer zone. In some places, the Wakhan Corridor is less than 10 miles wide – the closest that Britain and Russia had come to meeting in Central Asia.

Obviously, Afghanistan lied at the very heart of strategy-building in London and St. Petersburg. In the first two thirds of the Great Game, an invasion force deemed likely to pour into India only via eastern Afghan passes; a realisation shared by the Russian forward school of thought. Therefore, the loyalty of the Afghan kingdom played a crucial role - secret emissaries were sent from Russia and British India to assess the stability of the Afghan throne - and the potential for influence. These ambitions did not only materialise with peaceful means. In 1839, the British looked for a pre-text to invade the country, as the Afghan ruler, Dost Mohammed, seemed unlikely to support the British case for strategic protection agains the Russians. The First Afghan War ended with a tragedy. 45000 soldiers invaded the country via the Bolan pass and reached Kabul shortly after. Already by November of the same year, the British governors were tremendously unpopular for rampantly unislamic behaviour, so that the population longed to overthrow them. They could eventually drive the occupants out, inflicting heavy losses to British manpower and - what prove more crucial in the future course of the Game - their psychology.

The Great Game is a fascinating read. Famous and unforgettable characters like Francis Younghusband, Arthur Conolly and others were able to shape a historical process in a very individual way - through courage, risk, and boldness. Today we know that most of the fear and reasoning on both sides based on vague assumptions rather than military intelligence. The Russians always embraced the idea to invade British India and extend their influence to South Asia. In reality, it had to look somewhat different. Endless trouble in the Caucasus, the Crimean War and finally the Russian-Japanese War showed that events elsewhere were of a bigger importance for the future course of Russian history. Nevertheless, the Great Game remained unforgettable - undoubtedly because it is a story blossoming with treachery, conspiracy and wildest exotic. Breathtaking ventures and obscure tête-à-têtes at the end of the world gave this history lesson a very personal note. Therefore, it is not surprising that a reprise of the term can only bring positive publicity. But, what is this new Great Game all about - and - is it a 'modern variant of the nineteenth century clash of imperial ambitions' which finally could help us understand events taking place in Central Asia today?

The New Great Game

Well, this is a tough one. In how far can we see similarities between 'new' and 'old' Great Game? Lutz Kleveman, my ex-boss and friend has brought forward numerous arguments for the historical analogy:

In this rerun of the first great game - the 19th-century imperial rivalry between the British Empire and Tsarist Russia - players once again position themselves to control the heart of the Eurasian landmass. Today, the US has taken over the leading role from the British. Along with the Russians, new regional powers, such as China, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, have entered the arena, and transnational oil corporations are also pursuing their own interests.

The main spoils in today's Great Game are Caspian oil and gas. On its shores, and at the bottom of the Caspian Sea, lie the world's biggest untapped fossil fuel resources. Estimates range from 110 to 243bn barrels of crude, worth up to $4 trillion. According to the US department of energy, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan alone could sit on more than 130bn barrels, more than three times the US's reserves. Oil giants such as ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco and BP have already invested more than $30bn in new production facilities.

However, by trying to comb together points fitting into the Great Game style of imperial struggle, the new Great Game neglects a rather more diversified reality, argues Rosemary Righter on openDemocracy, another of my former employers.

Western (not just American) interest in Caspian oil reserves is certainly intense. But “euphoria” is much too strong a word to describe this interest...

It is exactly this euphoria which is the missing link to the nineteenth century variant of a struggle for imperial supremacy in Central Asia. The region's strategic weight is definitely immense, however, it is not superior to the Middle or Near East. The War on Terror might have acted as a 50% pre-text to station troops on ex-Soviet soil, all correct. But, as numbers never lie, the importance should not be exaggerated. Currently, less than 10,000 US-troops are based on Central Asian territory, a number highly inferior to bases in other areas. What is happening now in my opinion is the realisation of a potential. The super- and local powers now contemplate about the future of this region. Illoyal regional leaders who don't seem to align themselves explicitly, uncertain oil reserves and other areas of bigger importance are all aspects which seem to limit the 'New Great Game's' magnitude. For now.

Of course, resentments exist in Moscow over the active engagement of American politics and military in the region since 9/11. Growing concerns on Chinese involvement in the region's highly sensitive hydrocarbon issues play a role, too - as well as old rivalry between local power Iran and the USA. However, pipeline issues, which make up a big part of the suspected 'New Great Game' are genuinely exaggerated in the press, too.

In a desperate effort to decrease its dependence on the Saudi oil sheikhs, the United States seeks to secure and control the Caspian oil resources. However, bloody conflicts have broken out over disputed pipeline routes from the landlocked region to high-sea ports. Russia, still regarding itself as imperial overlord of its former colonies, is trying to hold the US at arm’s length and promotes pipeline routes through the north Caucasus.

By contrast, Washington champions pipelines that would circumvent both Russia and Iran. One of them, first planned by the US oil company Unocal in the mid-1990s, would run from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean. Construction has already begun for another pipeline, running from Azerbaijan’s capital Baku via neighbouring Georgia to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.

The Bush administration has used the war on terror for a massive military build-up in Central Asia, dramatically altering the geo-strategic power equations in the region. Washington seeks to seal the American cold war victory against Russia, to contain Chinese influence, and to tighten the noose around Iran.

There are some wrong assumptions in this logic. American military build-up in Central Asia is mainly limited to the two 'republics' of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, hundreds of miles away from the suspected spearhead of Washington's Central Asia strategy, the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. With US bases in Turkey, there is no need for America to protect Western Caspian oil by deploying troops in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

As for the Central Asian pipeline (running through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan to reach South Asia), it will be the investors' last word whether construction is viable. Therefore, it cannot be a political decision - and as Afghanistan does not reach stable conditions (due to a lack of Western interest) - this pipeline remains a map exercise. Hence, Rosemary Righter assumes correctly that:

on pipelines, Kleveman simplifies enormously. First, there are many more potential and actual pipeline routes than he indicates. Second, it is wrong to present this as an American-Russian fight for control. The Kazakhs favour lines running through Russia primarily for economic, not political, reasons – a sentiment reciprocated in Moscow. The Americans are certainly keen on pipelines that circumvent Iran; for reasons that currently seem fairly obvious.

However, Lutz puts forward many valid points which can foreshadow a rather uneasy process in the future. America's foreign policy is not too independent of oil and energy considerations - understandable if taking into account the tremendously important position hydrocarbons play in the superpower's economic policy - whose growing dependence on imported oil makes it also more vulnerable to devastating supply shocks. If Kazakhstan's hydrocarbon sector will develop favourably, and Turkmenistan with its massive gas deposits opens up to foreign investment, Central Asia's importance will inevitably grow. To speak of a 'New Great Game', though, does not quite reflect the truth. Again, reality is rather multi-layered. If a game, then there are far more players and far more individual agendas than in the nineteenth century. Nation states play an important role, but - investments in the hydrocarbon sector stay in the business domain, being responsive to classical business rhetorics and dynamisms. Geopolitics is not guaranteeing enough security to build a pipeline, the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline being a good example for that.

Therefore, a 'New Great Game' might take place, however, it is miles away from its historical source, making the comparison a useless undertaking. Maybe it is just 'Another Great Game'?

Welcome aboard

Right. I am no longer the sole editor of this weblog. It is my pleasure to welcome my mate Schwartz aboard - live and direct from Philadelphia in the United States. I am actually quite glad to share the burden of maintaining a weblog passionately read by at least 2 (or 3?) people all over the world (...). A couple of weeks ago, I even got an email from a German conspiracy-theorist-dude encouraging me to keep up the good work. Is that the audience we are looking for? Anyway. All publicity is good publicity.
Schwartz and I will be heading East this year. I am going to Kyrgyzstan and Schwartz is going to get first-hand insights into the Israel-Palestine conflict. So, why not sharing thoughts, impressions and lessons learnt? Keep yourself updated on the voyages of two SOAS-students to the Wild East. Besides all that, Schwartz (or Chris, whatever you prefer) is going to be the 'moral correspondent' of this blog - reflecting on philosophical issues, religious matters, etc. The name - Central Asia Weblog - has to change then, obviously. We'll keep you updated about any further changes. Subscribe to the newsletter for that purpose, too.

Herzlich Willkommen Schwartz. Mitunter wieder in Philadelphia (wo er sich als Pferdekutscher seine Kröten verdient), wird er sich zunächst aus den USA und ab Juli diesen Jahres aus Israel in diesem Blog zu Wort melden. Seine Artikel hier sind hauptsächlich in zwei Kategorien zu verfolgen: Reflections (religiös-Philosophisches) und Oasis of Peace (dem Log über seinen Israel-Aufenthalt in der Oase des Friedens).

Schwartz - Why am I alive?

Reflection

Each of us is born as if awoken from a blissful sleep into what first appears as a nightmare: a bewildering and terrifying existence of warring governments, exploitative economic systems, and fleeting personal relationships. Moreover, each generation is the inheritor of this mad spectacle. We all realize that it was not from the ore of our dreams that this maelstrom was crafted, and this revelation compels each of us to ask ourselves, Why am I alive? This is the eternal puzzle, the supreme Question, the quest for whose enigmatic solution, the ultimate Answer, propels all human activity.

Most people dare not seek the true Answer; instead they settle for the false doctrine of Eat, Sleep, Work, Play, Breed. Their minds are frozen by a blizzard of half-truths and lies that storms forth from the fog of manipulative mass-media and socioeconomic injustice. They trade their passions and hopes for delusions of stability. For people of means, “stability” is defined as a nine-to-five office-cubicle job, a prefabricated house in the sprawling spiderweb of suburbia, and a gargantuan sports-utility-vehicle that guzzles gasoline and self-aggrandizement. Unfortunately, most people are not people of means. For the impovershed underclass, “stability” means simply a job, any job, and they grind themselves beneath the gear of society for survival’s sake.

Both groups - called in traditional Marxist terminology as the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, respectively - are trapped in immediacy’s idolatrous cult. The bourgeoisie strive for immediate sensual gatification to pleasure away the insecurity of their middling socioeconomic position. Meanwhile the proletariat strive for immediate financial gratification to safeguard for their progeny some semblance of a bourgeoisie-like “better future.” Both seek to avoid extinction, but as the great religions teach, the more anyone is ruled by fear and materialism, the deader the soul becomes.

There do exist individuals who are essentially classless. Rather than surrendering themselves to obscurity, they commit themselves to the dazzingly black ideal of glory - financial wealth, political power, spiritual righteousness - the quest for which purges them of the torturous uncertainty that haunts the rest of civilization. Their Answer is, To thrive at all costs. They see the nightmare of history and forget that it is only a passing dream, an illusion. They deem the dog-eat-dog chaos "reality," priding themselves for their so-called "realism."

Opposite the “realists” are those who see through the hallucination. They discern a pattern lurking beneath events, an epic progressing toward a final state of peace and opportunity. So to speak, they can see the peak of Zion just beyond the hill of the here-and-now. Their Answer is, To live Life fully, defined either universally or exclusively private. Typically through art, sports, or activism, they work toward that utopia.

Yet, I belong in none of these groups. I have no Answer, but in the vacuum of my heart lingers vague recollections of Eden. There are others like me, and I sense that our greatest wish is to battle the shadows of existence to give Innocence a fighting chance in the world’s brutal wilderness.

Say Salaam to the Phantom of Ben's Blog

Salaam/Shalom/Pax!

The name's Christopher Schwartz. I met Ben back in September 2003 during a brief stint at the School of Oriental and African Studies. Ever meet someone with whom instinctively felt at ease -- someone you automatically knew would be one of your closest friends? Well, I've only met three people like that in my entire life, and Ben is one of them. To this day I regret that we could only be acquainted for three months. When the school's Fall term was done, I had to return to the States to complete my Bachelor's in Philosophy and Religion.

But now I'm done with undergaduate life, and thank Heavens! Now I can finally read the books I want to read and go to places I want to go -- that is, until my immense debt kicks in. You see, here in the US, students have to pay through the nose to attend school, and most of us can only pay with the help of the federal government, and it's a bit of a Faustian deal because the assistance comes to us in the form of loans. Thankfully the interest rates are tiny, and we are given a 6-month grace period to either find a job to repay the loans, return to school to delay repaying the loans, or stick ourselves in a situation which makes it too difficult for us to repay the loans -- which is sorta what I'm inadvertently doing: I'm going to the Middle East.

I've been studying Hebrew and Arabic for two years now, sometimes informally and sometimes academically (hence the time at SOAS). This past May I realized that it is high time I finally got my tuccus in gear and go over there, and that's just what I'm doing. From July through December I shall be a volunteer at an experimental Jewish/Arab village near Jerusalem that is called Neve Shalom/Wahat As-Salaam (NSWAS), the Oasis of Peace.

The village is something of a kibbutzim lite. It was started in 1972 by a Dominican Catholic priest as an attempt to prove that the two Semitic communities can live together in peace -- which was the original plan of Zionism as dreamt by Theodor Herzl in his book Der Judenstaat and was the on-the-ground reality for a millennium in the Abbassid Caliphate and Ottoman Sultanate before the Modern Age decided to bungle everything! However, unlike Medieval times, when Jews where dhimmi (an Islamic legal term meaning "protected" and "second-class citizen") and "Arab" was a slur Turks flung at each other when pissed and lookin' for a fight, in the Oasis of Peace the two Semitic groups are absolutely equal. The village's government is democratically elected, its communal religious building is simultaneously a synagogue temple, church chapel and mosque masjid, and the community operates a bilingual/binational elementary school. Despite attempts by the Israeli government to make life impossible for the villagers, the Oasis of Peace has thrived: from two families and the priest in 1972, the little village on a hill has expanded to fifty families, with three hundred more on a waiting-list for entry!

Which is where I come in. NSWAS needs a team of practically-free laborers to help maintain the operation. Thus the village has a small volunteer corps enlisted via the Internet and word-of-mouth. The job itself is anything but glamorous: I'll be digging ditches in the sweltering heat, babysitting the community's children, and tending the gardens. However, this is a golden opportunity to be part of a truly wonderful project, to enhance my cultural and linguistic knowledge, and understand the insane carnage which has gripped the Holy Land.

This opportunity is a dream come true. In little over a month I will be walking the streets the ancient prophets walked. I will breathe the air Jesus breathed, feel the winds Muhammad felt upon his face as he ascended to the seven heavens. I shall touch the wall that Solomon built, and pray in the dome that Umar built. But I am not an existential voyeur, a tourism-hound. I intend to give something back to the Holy Land, hence my service to the Oasis of Peace. Years from now when my children ask me, "What were you doing when the ravages of war were being unleashed upon the city of peace?" I can reply with pride, "Fighting for the cause of peace."

Ben and I thought it would be cool for two friends who met at SOAS and were now traveling to the ends of the Earth to share a blog. I just want to say thank you to my friend for taking me aboard.

Link of the Week

Every other week, when an outstanding piece of web content crosses my way, I'll put the link to the site on to my blog. It does not necessarily have anything to do with Central Asia. You'll find the 'link of the week' at the bottom of the navigation bar. As it says in its title, all goes without comment. This week's link commemorates events on Tienamen Square 15 years ago. Go check it out! If you have any suggestions for a link, do not hesitate to email me!

Kyrgzstan travel

After having surfed for ages in search of a usable online travel guide for Kyrgyzstan, I found 'kirgistan-reisen.de'. In great depth, the site covers different general topics which one would expect in a guide like that. On top of that, it offers a nice, clickable map of the country - giving a geographical impression of it all.

from the (bilingual) website:

A brilliant resource for travel destinations throughout the country. Makes the country appear closer and more accessible than thought before. We'll make the practice test during the summer.

Recommended, too: the gallery - offering a great insight into life in this remote country. Can't wait!

- http://www.kirgistan-reisen.de

>Background #5: Saparmurat Niyazov

Saparmurat Niyazov ist eine sonderbare Erscheinung. Fernab internationaler Beachtung führt er sein Turkmenistan mit eiserner Hand - und einer schieren Unzahl von Absurditäten. Vielerorts wird das Land ob des Personenkults um Turkmenbashi - den Führer aller Turkmenen (wörtliche Übersetzung) - als 'Stalins Disneyland' beschrieben. Selten jedoch nur können sich Interessierte einen klärenden Blick vor Ort verschaffen. Turkmenistan ist eines der am schwersten zugänglichen Länder der Welt.

Saparmurat Niyazov wurde am 19. Februar 1940 in der turkmenischen Hauptstadt Ashgabad nahe der iranischen Grenze geboren. Seine Kindheit sollte von schweren Schicksalsschlägen geprägt sein: Sein Vater kehrte nicht von den Schlachtfeldern des Zweiten Weltkriegs wieder; und die verbliebenen Mitglieder seiner Familie starben in dem verheerenden Erdbeben von 1948, welches hunderttausende mit in den Tod riss. Anschließend wuchs der junge Saparmurat im Waisenhaus und bei entfernten Verwandten auf, bevor er zum Studium nach St. Petersburg fortging. Von dort kehrte er 1966 als Elektrizätsingenieur zurück und begann, im städtischen Elektrizitätswerk zu arbeiten. Seine politische Karriere startete 1962, als er Mitglied der Kommunistischen Partei wurde. Erst später gelangte er jedoch in die wichtigen und hohen Spheren des Staatsapparats, was ihn, in den Wirren und Unsicherheiten der Unabhängigkeit, mit dem Präsidentenjob belohnen sollten. Am 27. Oktober 1990, auf den Tag genau ein Jahr vor der offiziellen Unabhängigkeit, wurde Niyazov zum ersten Präsidenten der Turkmenischen SSR gewählt, jenes nahezu identische Amt, welches er bis zum heutigen Tag bekleidet.

Über Nyazov als Mensch ist nur wenig genaues bekannt, jedoch lassen sich aus einer Vielzahl von Obskuritäten seines Führungsstils und den Geschehnissen der letzten Jahre gewisse Merkmale herleiten, welche die Person hinter Turkmenbashi erklären können. "Es erinnert einen etwas an Kim Il Sung in Nord-Korea, aber es ist anders, es ist viel bizarrer", sagt eine westliche Diplomatin (siehe: The New Great Game von Lutz Kleveman). Eines ist jedoch unbestritten: In keinem anderen Staat der Ex-Sowjetunion hat ein solch personenbezogenes Regime überlebt. Viele Beobachter sehen die verlustreiche Kindheit als einen entscheidenen Faktor in der Personalakte Turkmenbashis. Sein Überleben im Erdbeben von 1948 mit 110.000 Toten gilt als psychologisches Schlüssel-Ereignis. Ein Denkmal in Ashgabad bezeugt dies: Neben dem 'Bogen der Neutralität' befindet sich ein Monument zur Erinnerung an das Beben, das ein Drittel der Stadtbevölkerung nicht überlebten. Es wird durch einen wilden Bullen symbolisiert, der den Globus mit seinen Hörnern wegzuschleudern scheint. Nyazovs sterbende Mutter fällt in einen schreienden Abgrund, mit letzter Kraft ihren Sohn hochhaltend. Die Katastrophe als Ankunft des nationalen Heldens, des Führer aller Turkmenen. Symbolträchtiger geht es kaum. "Der Fakt, dass er überleben durfte, muss ihn überzeugt haben, dass er zu den Ausgewählten gehört."

Dieses spirituelle Erlebnis scheint sich wie ein Leitmotiv durch die Handlungen Turkmenbashis durchzuziehen. Seine Perzeption als Heiliger, als sprichwörtlicher Vater der Nation, scheint sich in ihm verselbstständigt zu haben und treibt den Kult um die Person zu immer neuen Spitzen. Dabei ist es jedoch notwendig zu differenzieren: Nyazov ist kein Tyrann, der aufgrund fehlender Realitätsnähe Gräuel am eigenen Volk verrichtet. So bringt es Lutz' Vertraute in Ashgabad auf den Punkt: "Turkmenbashi ist mehr wie ein Kind, und noch ein recht verrücktes dazu."

Bizarr und anachronistisch: Turkmenbashis Königreich

Was macht dieser zentralasiatische Despot in seiner Freizeit? Nun, bis vor kurzem schien er ein gesteigertes Interesse für's Monumentale zu haben. Das Arsenal an Eigenwilligkeiten in Turkmenistan ist groß, dennoch scheint nur die reine Aufzählung dieser scheinbaren Sagen aus Tausendundeinernacht das ganze Ausmaß dieses Phänomens erklären.

Der Präsidentenpalast ist des Landesvaters ganzer Stolz. Es wurde auf einem Hügel errichtet, um den kaskadierenden Wasserspielen die nötige Neigung zu verleihen. Vorher war die ganze Gegend bewohnt; der Neubau jedoch machte die Zwangsumsiedlung der Einheimischen unausweichlich. Wie alle offiziellen Gebäude besitzt auch der Palast Wände aus Marmor, der - dem Stil entsprechend - eigens aus Italien importiert werden musste. Das ganze Land scheint vor wahnwitzigen Projekten nur zu strotzen: Einer Obsession mit Wasser folgend, liess Turkmenbashi einen riesigen Wasserpark errichten, mit tausenden Fontänen in allen vorstellbaren Formen und Farben. Dass das Land zu über 90 Prozent aus Wüste besteht, scheint dem Projekt kein Hindernis zu sein. Weitere pompöse Bauten säumen die Straßen der Innenstadt Ashgabads, unter ihnen der weltgrößte Springbrunnen, dessen Wasser bei sengenden Sommertemperaturen verdunstet und die Trinkwasserknappheit verschärft.

In allen Straßenzügen springt einem Turkmenbashis Gesicht entgegen, Porträts an allen Ecken und Enden. Sogar Lautsprecher (der Marke Sony) kunden von wichtigen Nachrichten aus dem politischen Einheitsbrei der offiziell parlamentarischen Demokratie. Das Antlitz Nyazovs ist auf allen Geldscheinen vertreten, wobei eine bizarre Anekdote die Eitelkeit des Präsidenten unterstreicht: Inmitten der neunziger Jahre wurden Geldscheine gedruckt, die der mitunter ergrauten Haarpracht Turkmenbashis Rechenschaft trugen und ihn als mittelalten Mann darstellten. Nach einiger Zeit jedoch schien sich Unbehagen in dem heute 64-jährigen zu bilden: Er ließ alle Geldscheine einsammeln und neue, ihn mit schwarzem Haar abbildend, in Umlauf bringen. Diese und weitere schräge Geschichten aus Turkmenistan haben internationale Institutionen abgeschreckt. Wie geht man mit einem solchen Wüstendespoten um, dem es - scheinbar vollen Herzens - um die Verwirklichung seiner gottgesandten Aufgaben geht?

Blick nach außen

Dabei ist Turkmenistan ein vielversprechendes Land. Internationale Aufmerksamkeit scheinen allein schon die reichlichen Gasvorräte zu garantieren. Dennoch sind Investoren lieber vorsichtig, was das Land am Kaspischen Meer betrifft. Anders als in Kasachstan und Aserbaidschan sind vor Ort noch keine großen Projekte durchgestartet. Über das bestehende Pipeline-Netz exportiert Turkmenistan sein Gas ausschließlich Richtung Russland - welches (als einziger potentieller Abnehmer) natürlich Preise unerhört nach unten drücken kann. Kürzlich in den Medien auftauchende Planspiele über eine Ölpipeline von Kasachstan über Turkmenistan und Afghanistan nach Pakistan wurden als unrealistisch abgetan, obwohl nach dem Fall der Taliban 2002 ein Memorandum von den Präsidenten der beteiligten Länder unterzeichnet wurde. Einziges Problem: Bisher findet sich schlicht kein Investor, der bereit ist, in diesen schwierigen Ländern - allen voran Afghanistan - zu investieren.

Ob sich das Geschäftsklima zu verbessern scheint, ist nicht abzusehen. Immer noch herrschen allseits bekannte Probleme vor, die wie vielerorts im ex-Sowjetischen Raum Investitionen so unberechenbar machen. Undurchsichtige Bürokratie, kein allgemeingültiges Investitionsrecht sowie ein schier endlos scheinender Dschungel von Genehmigungen und Regularien erschweren die Schaffung eines transparenten Codex für ausländische Direktinvestitionen (FDI). Das Potential für weitreichende wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in Turkmenistan ist unbestrittenerweise vorhanden, die Gasvorräte zählen zu den umfangreichsten der Welt. Jedoch flossen zwischen 1999 und 2001 jährlich durchschnittlich nur 125 Millionen US-Dollar ins Land, ein Bruchteil verglichen mit Investitionsströmen nach Kasachstan.

Für weitere Verstörung sorgt Turkmenistans anscheinend felsenfeste Neutralität. Nach dem 11. September sollte das Land als einzigstes den Krieg gegen den Terror nicht offen unterstützen. Schon zuvor wurde Turkmenbashis Demokratie unter dem Verdacht gerügt, er unterhalte ungewohnt freundschaftliche Beziehungen zu den Taliban. Nichtsdestotrotz ergriff Nyazov keine Partei, als amerikanische Bomben auf das Nachbarland fielen. Die einzigste Konzession, die er den Allierten machen wollte, war, Hilfslieferungen über sein Land zu Notleidenden südlich der Grenze kommen zu lassen und begrenzte Überflugsrechte zu gewähren.

Analyse

Vielerorts als lächerlicher und verschrobener Diktator dargestellt, der den Bösewichtern der Schurkenstaaten nicht das Wasser reichen kann, sollte man jedoch auch vorsichtig mit solch 'verniedlichenden' Charakeristika für einen unumschränkten Herrscher umgehen, so märchenhaft diese Erzählungen auch klingen mögen. Staatsterror und universell repressive Maßnahmen gegen politische Gegner scheinen zum Alltagsgeschäft in Turkmenistan zu gehören. Die Opposition agiert aus dem Exil, vornehmlich aus Moskau. Angaben über politische Gefangene sind vage und ohne genaue Bestätigung. Eine ähnlich wie in Usbekistan wahrgenommene Bedrohung von islamistischen Gebilden existiert in Turkmenistan nicht. Widerworte waren verstärkt von alten Genossen Nyazovs zu vernehmen, so etwa seinem ersten Aussenminister Avdi Kuliev, der das Land 1992 verließ.

Kürzlich wurden erneut die Ein- und Ausreisebestimmungen verschärft. Fortan ist es für Einwohner nur noch schwierig möglich, das Land auf legalem Wege zu verlassen - Reisefreiheit ist und bleibt ein Fremdwort. Somit lassen sich für den zusehends paranoiden Turkmenbashi die Bewegungen der Opposition noch besser kontrollieren. Ein angeblich fingiertes Attentat auf seine Person diente ihm als Mittel zum Zweck, gegen Opposition und vermeintliche Terroristen vorzugehen. Moskauer Exilanten sind sich jedoch einig in der Meinung, das Zentrum der Oppositionsbemühungen müsse sich im Land befinden, um den Druck auf die Regierung und insbesondere Nyazov zu erhöhen. Inwiefern dieses Unternehmen Erfolgschancen besitzt, hängt von der Akzeptanz der Gruppen innerhalb der Bevölkerung ab, deren interner Einheit und internationaler Unterstützung.

Nyazov ist um seine Beliebtheit beim Volk bemüht. Vor einiger Zeit soll ihn die Frage danach zu einer wahrhaft interessanten Tat hingerissen haben. Angeblich befestigte er sich einen falschen Bart im Gesicht und fuhr mit seiner gepanzerten Mercedes Limousine durch die Straßen, um Menschen direkt zu befragen, wie sie denn den Präsidenten fänden. Da dieser ominöse Fragesteller jedoch in der Präsidentenlimousine und mit falschem Bart unterwegs war, wird er wohl kaum ehrliche Antworten bekommen haben. Es gibt jedoch auch noch andere - im Licht der Zustände in Turlmenistan noch merkwürdigere - Entwicklungen innerhalb der Palastmauern zu vernehmen. Die Medien berichten einheitlich von einer obskuren Tendenz: Turkmenbashi verschwindet. Am 21. Mai verschwanden Dutzende von Präsidenten-Porträts. Eine Woche später berichteten russische Medien von 'hunderten' entfernten Bildnissen. Vielleicht zeigten internationale Kritik (auch zusehends vonseiten der USA) und Nyazovs Furcht vor revolutionären Zuständen letztlich Wirkung? Vorsichtig sollten solche Meldungen vernommen werden, rät gundagor.org. Höchstwahrscheinlich hat dieses großflächige Entfernen etwas mit dem Eintreffen einer OSZE-Delegation zu tun. Unter Umständen jedoch bewegt sich Turkmenbashi. Auch die Ereignisse in Georgien letztes Jahr könnten einen entscheidenen psychologischen Impetus gehabt haben.

Die Weltfremdheit von Nyazov spricht letzlich nicht für ein überaus großes Potential zum friedlichen und moderaten Reformprozess unter ihm. Die nächsten Jahre werden entscheiden, ob sich in Turkmenistan eine Opposition herausbilden kann, die es vermag, dem Land eine fortschrittlichere Regierung zu stellen. Bis dahin wird sich die Weltgemeinschaft wohl mit Turkmenbashi arrangieren müssen, ohne zu vergessen, dass auch sie eine große Verantwortung an Bewegungen im Lande hat. Großzügiges Sponsoring von Exilgruppen (sofern sie denn eine demokratische Alternative verkörpern) könnte ein Weg sein, um aktiv Einfluss zu nehmen.