The Great Game by Peter Hopkirk

Regarding the publicity the term 'New Great Game' gets these days, I was very tempted to know more about the source of this adapted term. The 'Great Game' - a book written by Peter Hopkirk in 1994 - is the result of years of research. Peter Hopkirk, says a blurb on the back of the tome, is the laureate of the Great Game - whatever multilayered term it is. In essence, it could be swiftly defined as the imperial struggle for supremacy in Central Asia between Victorian England and Tzarist Russia. Hopkirk's book is a challenging 600-page tour de force, full of romantic anecdotal accounts of what happened throughout the 19th century and dominated Russo-Anglo bilateral relationships over this timespan. The story is blossoming with obscurities and adventures, from first expeditions of British and Russian adventurers to the realms of unknown and fabled Central Asian rulers to the brink of armed conflicts over the gateways to India. The amount of research the author has done is unrivaled; numerous original references and acribic accounts speak for endless hours in remote library archives of the Royal Geographical Society in London and - what makes his story a rather balanced approach to historical geo-politics - Russian data in Moscow.

A big deal of the Great Game based on a variety of perceived threats and the ignorance of decisionmakers at Whitehall and St. Petersburg. The United Kingdom's position seemed to swing according to who was in charge of affairs. A Tory government usually meant a revival of Russophobe ideology - leading to frosty diplomatic ties between the two superpowers. Russia in the 19th century was viewed with some sort of ambivalence. Its cultural distance and political backwardness appeared incompatible with Victorian progress, and the sheer scale of this Eastern empire led to suspicion so that Moscow's moves were watched with anxiety and analyses saw the country on the constant verge of expansionism. The excursions into the Southern tier of its area of influence fed this theory. Count Nesselrode said in a cabinet meeting as early as 1816: ‘As long as Middle Asia is not ours, we must not spend any thoughts on the conquest of whole Asia.”

However, the Great Game went alongside Britain's industrialisation, which meant that her fleet became far more powerful, her armies had more firepower, and her worldwide colonial possessions made her have a strategic advantage. But, this last point also revealed Britain's potential disadvantage in the Great Game. Today, one would call these symptoms characteristic of an 'overstretched' empire. Still, problems were more of a practical nature: In case of a Russian attack on British belongings in India; how could one react quickly with a reasonable counterforce? This question lied at the very heart of strategic reasoning of the Great Game. It boosted careers of risky adventurers and discoverers cartographing the region and designing shaky alliances with unruly despots while making sure that one's moves are not being monitored by Moscow. There were winners and loosers; but Russia and Britain, though, never declared open war on eachother over the rivalries of the Great Game. It was a quiet and secret undertaking, carried out on distant passes and valleys in the heart of Central Asia - an area, which was by then terra incognita for the adversaries and bore various surprises, good and bad. Ultimately, the feared invasion never came.

When play began early in the 19th century, the frontiers of the two imperial powers lay two thousand miles apart, across vast deserts and almost impassable mountain ranges; by the end, only some miles separated the two rivals.

The narrow strip with which Afghanistan stretches out to the far North-East is called the Wakhan corridor (see map):

British strategists had feared that the Tsar would claim this territory, so in the closing years of the 19th century, a narrow corridor of land was given to Afghanistan, to create a neutral buffer zone. In some places, the Wakhan Corridor is less than 10 miles wide – the closest that Britain and Russia had come to meeting in Central Asia.

Obviously, Afghanistan lied at the very heart of strategy-building in London and St. Petersburg. In the first two thirds of the Great Game, an invasion force deemed likely to pour into India only via eastern Afghan passes; a realisation shared by the Russian forward school of thought. Therefore, the loyalty of the Afghan kingdom played a crucial role - secret emissaries were sent from Russia and British India to assess the stability of the Afghan throne - and the potential for influence. These ambitions did not only materialise with peaceful means. In 1839, the British looked for a pre-text to invade the country, as the Afghan ruler, Dost Mohammed, seemed unlikely to support the British case for strategic protection agains the Russians. The First Afghan War ended with a tragedy. 45000 soldiers invaded the country via the Bolan pass and reached Kabul shortly after. Already by November of the same year, the British governors were tremendously unpopular for rampantly unislamic behaviour, so that the population longed to overthrow them. They could eventually drive the occupants out, inflicting heavy losses to British manpower and - what prove more crucial in the future course of the Game - their psychology.

The Great Game is a fascinating read. Famous and unforgettable characters like Francis Younghusband, Arthur Conolly and others were able to shape a historical process in a very individual way - through courage, risk, and boldness. Today we know that most of the fear and reasoning on both sides based on vague assumptions rather than military intelligence. The Russians always embraced the idea to invade British India and extend their influence to South Asia. In reality, it had to look somewhat different. Endless trouble in the Caucasus, the Crimean War and finally the Russian-Japanese War showed that events elsewhere were of a bigger importance for the future course of Russian history. Nevertheless, the Great Game remained unforgettable - undoubtedly because it is a story blossoming with treachery, conspiracy and wildest exotic. Breathtaking ventures and obscure tête-à-têtes at the end of the world gave this history lesson a very personal note. Therefore, it is not surprising that a reprise of the term can only bring positive publicity. But, what is this new Great Game all about - and - is it a 'modern variant of the nineteenth century clash of imperial ambitions' which finally could help us understand events taking place in Central Asia today?

The New Great Game

Well, this is a tough one. In how far can we see similarities between 'new' and 'old' Great Game? Lutz Kleveman, my ex-boss and friend has brought forward numerous arguments for the historical analogy:

In this rerun of the first great game - the 19th-century imperial rivalry between the British Empire and Tsarist Russia - players once again position themselves to control the heart of the Eurasian landmass. Today, the US has taken over the leading role from the British. Along with the Russians, new regional powers, such as China, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, have entered the arena, and transnational oil corporations are also pursuing their own interests.

The main spoils in today's Great Game are Caspian oil and gas. On its shores, and at the bottom of the Caspian Sea, lie the world's biggest untapped fossil fuel resources. Estimates range from 110 to 243bn barrels of crude, worth up to $4 trillion. According to the US department of energy, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan alone could sit on more than 130bn barrels, more than three times the US's reserves. Oil giants such as ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco and BP have already invested more than $30bn in new production facilities.

However, by trying to comb together points fitting into the Great Game style of imperial struggle, the new Great Game neglects a rather more diversified reality, argues Rosemary Righter on openDemocracy, another of my former employers.

Western (not just American) interest in Caspian oil reserves is certainly intense. But “euphoria” is much too strong a word to describe this interest...

It is exactly this euphoria which is the missing link to the nineteenth century variant of a struggle for imperial supremacy in Central Asia. The region's strategic weight is definitely immense, however, it is not superior to the Middle or Near East. The War on Terror might have acted as a 50% pre-text to station troops on ex-Soviet soil, all correct. But, as numbers never lie, the importance should not be exaggerated. Currently, less than 10,000 US-troops are based on Central Asian territory, a number highly inferior to bases in other areas. What is happening now in my opinion is the realisation of a potential. The super- and local powers now contemplate about the future of this region. Illoyal regional leaders who don't seem to align themselves explicitly, uncertain oil reserves and other areas of bigger importance are all aspects which seem to limit the 'New Great Game's' magnitude. For now.

Of course, resentments exist in Moscow over the active engagement of American politics and military in the region since 9/11. Growing concerns on Chinese involvement in the region's highly sensitive hydrocarbon issues play a role, too - as well as old rivalry between local power Iran and the USA. However, pipeline issues, which make up a big part of the suspected 'New Great Game' are genuinely exaggerated in the press, too.

In a desperate effort to decrease its dependence on the Saudi oil sheikhs, the United States seeks to secure and control the Caspian oil resources. However, bloody conflicts have broken out over disputed pipeline routes from the landlocked region to high-sea ports. Russia, still regarding itself as imperial overlord of its former colonies, is trying to hold the US at arm’s length and promotes pipeline routes through the north Caucasus.

By contrast, Washington champions pipelines that would circumvent both Russia and Iran. One of them, first planned by the US oil company Unocal in the mid-1990s, would run from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean. Construction has already begun for another pipeline, running from Azerbaijan’s capital Baku via neighbouring Georgia to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.

The Bush administration has used the war on terror for a massive military build-up in Central Asia, dramatically altering the geo-strategic power equations in the region. Washington seeks to seal the American cold war victory against Russia, to contain Chinese influence, and to tighten the noose around Iran.

There are some wrong assumptions in this logic. American military build-up in Central Asia is mainly limited to the two 'republics' of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, hundreds of miles away from the suspected spearhead of Washington's Central Asia strategy, the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. With US bases in Turkey, there is no need for America to protect Western Caspian oil by deploying troops in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

As for the Central Asian pipeline (running through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan to reach South Asia), it will be the investors' last word whether construction is viable. Therefore, it cannot be a political decision - and as Afghanistan does not reach stable conditions (due to a lack of Western interest) - this pipeline remains a map exercise. Hence, Rosemary Righter assumes correctly that:

on pipelines, Kleveman simplifies enormously. First, there are many more potential and actual pipeline routes than he indicates. Second, it is wrong to present this as an American-Russian fight for control. The Kazakhs favour lines running through Russia primarily for economic, not political, reasons – a sentiment reciprocated in Moscow. The Americans are certainly keen on pipelines that circumvent Iran; for reasons that currently seem fairly obvious.

However, Lutz puts forward many valid points which can foreshadow a rather uneasy process in the future. America's foreign policy is not too independent of oil and energy considerations - understandable if taking into account the tremendously important position hydrocarbons play in the superpower's economic policy - whose growing dependence on imported oil makes it also more vulnerable to devastating supply shocks. If Kazakhstan's hydrocarbon sector will develop favourably, and Turkmenistan with its massive gas deposits opens up to foreign investment, Central Asia's importance will inevitably grow. To speak of a 'New Great Game', though, does not quite reflect the truth. Again, reality is rather multi-layered. If a game, then there are far more players and far more individual agendas than in the nineteenth century. Nation states play an important role, but - investments in the hydrocarbon sector stay in the business domain, being responsive to classical business rhetorics and dynamisms. Geopolitics is not guaranteeing enough security to build a pipeline, the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline being a good example for that.

Therefore, a 'New Great Game' might take place, however, it is miles away from its historical source, making the comparison a useless undertaking. Maybe it is just 'Another Great Game'?

Der Jahrhundertweg

Tschingis Aitmatow: 'Der Tag zieht den Jahrhundertweg' (I dol'še veka dlitsja deń): Faszinierende Einblicke ins Leben, betrachtet vom Ende der Welt - mitten aus den endlosen Weiten der kasachischen Steppe. Derselbe Mann schrieb auch die bewegende Liebesgeschichte 'Djamila', die ganz in der Nähe von Bishkek stattgefunden haben muss.

Ein aktuelles Interview mit dem Autor über die Situation in seiner Heimat findet sich hier.

Aitmatow ist jetzt kirgisischer Botschafter in Belgien und nicht mehr allzu oft in seiner Heimat anzutreffen. Er besitzt jedoch noch ein Haus im Westen Talas', im Dorf Scheker - wo ihm auch ein Museum für seine Verdienste gedenkt.

What we see depends mainly on what we look for.
Sir John Lubbock 1834-1913, British Statesman, Banker, Naturalist

Amen.